



Abstract—Online transactions using mobile agents need 
secure protocols to help the mobile agents to accomplish the 
transactions initiated by a client in an electronic commerce. 
However, the mobile agent could encounter hostile 
environment. For example, a server may compromise the 
mobile agent and try to obtain   private information of the 
client. A solution to tackle this issue has been proposed. 
However, the existing solution is implemented using RSA 
signatures,  that result in long signatures and heavy workloads 
for the mobile agent. Mobile agents will migrate from the 
client to a server and from one server to other servers in order 
to accomplish the client’s transaction plan. Therefore, it will 
be interesting to re-tackle this issue. We present a new scheme 
for secure transactions using mobile agents in potentially 
hostile environments. This transaction scheme is implemented 
by using a new undetachable signature scheme. The new 
undetachable signature protocol utilizes short signatures, 
which is desirable for low-bandwidth and efficient mobile 
communications.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
here are increasing number of applications that seek to use 
mobile agents in e-commerce and virtual communities. 
Security and privacy are major issues for such 
environments. Various solutions have been proposed for this 
issue, for example, encryption techniques, digital signature 
techniques (including general signature scheme, blind 
signature scheme, undeniable signature scheme, group 
signature scheme, etc. [9, 10]), and other cryptographic 
techniques [10], as well as steganography techniques.  
  Mobile agents are autonomous software entities that can 
autonomously migrate from one networked computer to 
another while executing. It can execute across networks in 
behavior of users. Mobile agents can be useful for many 
applications, especially those in Electronic Commerce [1]. 
Despite its many practical benefits, mobile agent technology 
results in significant new security threats from both malicious 
agents and hosts. 
 
. 
      Malicious hosts may cheat the mobile agents migrating to 
them and therefore interfere with the successful execution of 
the mobile agents. Therefore, it is interesting how to protect a 
mobile agent which is in transit or is executing on a remote 
site.  In this paper, we provide an efficient tackle. 
     In a virtual community, delegation of signing rights is an 
important issue, since security and privacy are concerned.  
Consider such an scenario: There is an International Logistics 
Pty. Ltd. AuHouse, whose President is scheduled to sign a big 
contract with an Automobile Company in Europe on Feb 28. 
However, because of certain emergence case, the President has 
to take part in a meeting held in the General Building of 
AuHouse  in Australia at the same day. This meeting will 
influence the future of the Auhouse. On the other hand, that 
contract in Europe is also very important to the AuHouse. For 
this case, how can the President sign the contract if he could 
not go to Europe? Undetachable signature protocol will help 
the President to solve this issue, since the undetachable 
signature protocol can provide the delegation of signing power 
whilst preserving the privacy of the President.  
  Therefore, two issues need to be tackled: The first is how 
to delegate the signing power? How to secure the private 
information of the customer? The second is to design short 
signatures for the mobile agents, which will enhance the 
capability of the mobile agents for communications in the e-
transactions.  In addition, it is still interesting whether the e-
transactions protocol could preserve the privacy not only for 
the customer but also for the server. In this paper, we address 
these issues.  
 The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. In 
section 2, we first provide the definition of undetachable 
signatures. In section 3, a new transaction protocol with 
mobile agents is proposed. In section 4, the analysis and proofs 
are provided, mainly including construction analysis, security 
analysis, as well as privacy analysis – a very important 
property for a practical virtual community. The performance 
analysis and the conclusions appear in section 5 and section 6, 
respectively. 
 
II. MODEL OF UNDETACHABLE SIGNATURES 
    
     In this section, we will provide the definition of  
undetachable signatures . This is the first definition for 
undetachable signatures to the best of our knowledge. 
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   An undetachable signature scheme consists of four 
algorithms, namely Setup, Key, Sign and Verify.  
 
   Setup is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which 
takes as input a security parameter k and outputs a family of 
system parameters. 
   Key is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which is 
executed by a trusted centre and the signers. The input 
contains system parameters, as well as random parameters 
which are chosen by the trusted centre and the signers. The 
output includes a public key pk K∈  and a corresponding secret 
key sk. 
   Sign is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm, which 
takes as input a secret key sk and a message m M∈  and 
outputs a signature 
skSig S∈ . In general, there are many valid 
signatures for any pair ( , )m pk M K∈ × . 
     Verify is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm. The 
input includes a message and its alleyed signature 
skSig S∈ , as 
well as system parameters. The output is “Accept” or 
“Otherwise”. 
 
III. NEW PROTOCOL FOR SECURE TRANSACTIONS WITH 
MOBILE AGENTS USING SHORT SIGNATURES  
A new undetachable signature scheme will be proposed for the 
protocol of secure transactions. This new undetachable scheme 
belongs to the domain of short signatures [2-6, 11, 12]. As 
described in the previous section, short signatures have the 
characteristics of shorter bit-length of signatures, fast signature 
generation, as well as fast signature verification [8].  These 
characteristics are imperative for mobile agents, which take 
part in the secure transactions between a customer and any 
server.   
 Previous constructions of udetachable signatures essentially 
utilize two methods: One method is based on birational 
functions as introduced by Sharmir [8]. This kind of 
construction has been proven to be not secure [7], since it is 
vulnerable against the attacks proposed by Coppersmith et al 
[5].   The other method is based on RSA signatures. It is 
known that the signature length will be at least 1024 or much 
greater in order to maintain the security of the RSA  
cryptosystem included.  That will increase the workload of the 
mobile agents involved. Therefore, it is still an open problem 
to construct an optimized undetachable signature scheme for 
mobile agents.  In the following, we will present a new 
construction for secure transactions with mobile agents. This 
construction is based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) 
[10]. Generally speaking, signatures based on ECC by 
themselves do not mean they are short signatures, for example 
[14]. However, the proposed signatures in our paper are short 
signatures. The details are as follows:   
 
A. Setup Algorithm 
 
We follow the notations in [2]:  
1. 1G  and 2G  are two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime 
order p; 
2. 1g  is a generator of 1G  and 2g  is a generator of 2G ; 
3. ψ is an isomorphism from 2G  to 1G , with ( ) 12 gg =ψ ; 
and 
4. e is a bilinear map TGGGe →× 21: . 
 
       For simplicity one can set G1 = G2. However, as in [2], 
we allow for the more general case where 21 GG ≠ so that we 
can take advantage of certain families of elliptic curves to 
obtain short signatures. Specifically, elements of G1 have a 
short representation whereas elements of 2G  may not. The 
proofs of security require an efficiently computable 
isomorphism 12: GG →ψ .  
When 21 GG = and g1 = g2 one could take ψ to be the 
identity map. On elliptic curves we can use the trace map as ψ. 
Let 1G  and 2G  be two groups as above, with an additional 
group TG  such that  
                                TGGG == 21 . 
 
      A bilinear map is a map TGGGe →× 21: with the 
following properties: 
1. Bilinear: for all 1Gu ∈ , 2Gv ∈ and a, b ∈ Z, 
( ) ( )abba vuevue ,, = . 
2. Non-degenerate:  ( ) 1, 21 =gge . 
 
We say that ( 1G , 2G ) are bilinear groups if there exists a 
group TG , an isomorphism 
             12: GG →ψ ,    
and a bilinear map 
TGGGe →× 21:  as above,  
and e, ψ, and the group action in 1G , 2G , and TG  can be 
computed efficiently. 
 
      Joux and Nguyen [15] showed that an efficiently 
computable bilinear map e provides an algorithm for solving 
the Decision Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH). 
 
Therefore, we use a setting of bilinear mapping groups in 
reference [2]. Each customer selects two generators  
11 Gg ∈ , 22 Gg ∈ , and e(. , .) as above. He will choose 
*
pZx ∈  and computes 22 Ggv
x ∈= . 1H  and 2H  are two 
secure cryptographic hash functions, such as SHA-1 [10]. That 
is:  
    (1) Customer selects 11 Gg ∈ , 22 Gg ∈  two generators. 
    (2) Customer Selects bilinear mapping ( )⋅⋅,e  as above. 
 
 
    (3) Customer randomly selects 
*
pZx ∈ and computes 
22 Ggv
x ∈= . 
    (4) Customer selects two securely cryptographic hash 
functions 1H  and 2H : 
      Therefore, the private key of the customer is x; the public 
key is 1g , 2g , ( )⋅⋅,e , 1H , and 2H . 
      Since we are constructing a transactions protocol, we 
should specify some corresponding information about the 
customer and the server. For example, who is the buyer? And 
who is the bidder (de facto seller). That is, what is the 
corresponding information of the customer and the server. 
Here, the server represents the host computer the mobile 
agents will visit in the transactions. Therefore, we let C be an 
identifier for the customer, and S be an identifier of the server. 
      In addition, we denote the constraints of the customer by 
CqRe , and the bid of the server  by SBid .  The two items 
are defined as follows: 
      CqRe  defines the requirements of the customer for a 
specific purchase. It includes: (1) the description of a desired 
product; (2) an expiration date and time stamp; (3) the 
maximum price that is acceptable to the customer; (4) a 
deadline for the delivery of the product. 
      SBid  defines the bid of the server for a selling activity. It 
includes:  (1) the description of the server’s product; (2) the 
minimum price that will be acceptable to the server; (3) a 
deadline for the delivery of the product; (4) a deadline for 
paying money into the bank account of the server; (5) an 
expiration date and time stamp. 
       
B. Key Algorithm 
 
   The Key algorithm is a probabilistic polynomial time 
algorithm, which is executed by the customer and the server; if 
possible, there exists a Trusted Third Party which is as a 
justice . 
    (1) The customer and the server will agree on a practical 
public key encryption algorithm prvpubE ⊗ , which will be used 
by the customer and the server respectively.  Here, pub and  
prv are the public key and the private key respectively. They 
may coexist or only one of them exists in the public key 
algorithm, since it is decided according to different encryption 
algorithm.  
     (2) The customer gets a pair of public key Cpub   and 
private key Cprv . Both of them may be authenticated by the 
the Trusted Third Party, if needed. 
     (3) The server gets a pair of public key Spub   and private 
key Sprv . Both of them may be authenticated by the the 
Trusted Third Party, if needed. 
 
         All these public keys and private keys will be involved 
when the customer initiates the e-Transaction with the server. 
The public key encryption algorithm can maintain the private 
communications between the customer and the server. 
 
C. Preparing the Agents 
 
The customer equips the Mobile Agent with executable codes. 
The executable codes are in fact an undetachable signature 
function pair: 
                    ( ) ( ) ( )paf mod−=                               
and  
                     ( ) ( )( )aHsigned gbf
−×= 2   
where ( )CqCHa Re,1=  is bounded by p; 11 Ggb x
a
∈= , 
where the exponentiation is computed modular p.  This b is in 
fact a variant version of the short signature in the following: 
              ( )( )pqCHa C modRe,1=  




We look on C as a message,  CqRe  as a random element. 
Then, the above a  and b  could be treated as the signature  
                ( )xrmh
1
,=σ  
on the message m; where  ( ) agrmh 1, = . This signature 
scheme’s security is based on an assumption of q-SDH [3].  
    Equipped with the executable codes, the mobile agent will 
migrate from the customer to the server. This agent will carry 
C and CqRe  as part of its data. 
 
 
D. Mobile Agent Execution 
 
        After the mobile agent arrives at the server, the agent will 
give all its data and the executable code to the server. The 
server will execute the executable code provided by mobile 
agent, i.e. ( )f  and ( )signedf . The details are as follows: 
         (1) The server computes alpha= H1(C, S, bid_S) 
( )SBidSCH ,,1=α  with a bid. 
 
         (2) The server computes  












       If pm mod00 ≡ , he will stop, since that is a 
meaningless transaction for the server. 
 
          (3) The server  computes:  
                         












































x ∈= .       
          (4) The server outputs the x-coordinate γ  of β , where 
γ  is an element in pZ . 
 
          (5) The server hands the mobile agent a tuple  
                         γα ,,,,, mBidSC S ; 
This tuple will represent part of the transaction. 
 
          (6) The mobile agent with the tuple migrates to its 
owner, i.e. the customer. 
 
E. Checking the Transaction  
 
      When the mobile agent returns from the server, the 
customer will check the returned data provided by the mobile 
agent. The customer will need to follow these steps: 
 
       (1) The customer will check the undetachable signature  
( )γ,m  for this transaction by utilizing the following 
formaula. 
 
       (2) The customer will find whether there is a point in 1G : 
( )tg ,3 γ=   (where t is an element in pZ )   
Such that the following equation holds in 1G : 
                       
             
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )mHmHxamH ggevge 2222 )(213 ,, +=  
 
If there is no such point, then the customer will not accept this 
transaction. Otherwise, she will accept this transaction. 
      That is to say, If the above equality holds, that certifies the 
transaction is valid. And then the customer will accept the 
transaction. Otherwise, the customer will arrange the current 
mobile agent or another mobile agent to migrate to another 
server to seek a desirable bid and accomplish the transaction.   
 
            
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSACTIONS PROTOCOL 
          
   This section we will analyze the proposed protocol of 
transactions with mobile agents. We first provide the 
construction analysis. That is, how the protocol works? What’s 
the principal of the protocol? How to allow the customer to 
obtain the optimal purchase? How the mobile agent help 
Transactions? In the second subsection, we will provide the 
security analysis for the proposed protocol. That is, how to  
extract the signature scheme from transactions? Why it is 
secure against the server attack? At the same time, we will give 
a definition on what is server attack.  
 
A.  Construction Analysis 
 
      We will deploy the proposed transactions protocol from 
the construction point of view. This will help us to further 
understand the transaction protocol. 
      In the transaction protocol, the mobile agent is awarded a 
pair of functions  ( ( )f  and ( )signedf )  and migrates with 
them to the server.  This pair of functions maintains the un-
leakage of the signing algorithm (actually the signing private 
key) of the customer. The input x of the server is linked to the 
server’s bid. At the same time, the mobile agent is also given 
the certified requirements of the customer (a, b), satisfying 
( ) ( ) ( )paf mod−= , and ( ) ( )( )aHsigned gbf
−×= 2  
in 1G  . The parameters of function ( )f  are such that the 
output of this function includes the customer’s constraints.  
The server modifies these by including the bid, SBid  in the 
input α , in such a way as to satisfy: 
• The message m links the constraints of the customer 
to the bid of the server. 
• Get an undetachable signature ( )γ,m   for the 
transaction, where ( )pam mod)( −= α  and γ  
is the x-coordinate of the point beta. This serves as a 
certificate which is authenticated by the customer as 
follows  
        
                   
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )mHmHxamH ggevge 2222 213 ,, +=  . 
 
      The certified constraints of the customer CqRe , and the 
bid of the server, SBid  restrict the scope of the context of  the 
transaction, i.e. the certificate ( )γ,m  to “optimal bid” 
transactions with the appropriate time-limits (or more 
generally, to whatever requirements the customer and the 
server stipulate).  
       Note that even if a server ignores the customer’s 
constraints CqRe  and executes the mobile agent associated 
 
 
with the executable code ( ( )f  and ( )signedf ) in order to 
produce an undetachable signature of the customer for a bogus 
bid., the signature will be invalid. If a server is not willing to 
bid for a purchase, then the mobile agent will travel  to another 
server to obtain an optimal bid for the transaction.. 
 
B. Security Analysis 
 
         It is known that the mobile agents will be vulnerable 
even in a virtual community, where some servers may be 
hostile. Therefore, it is necessary for us to analyze the security 
of the proposed transaction protocol. In this paper, we give the 
security analysis based on the undetachable signature scheme, 
which has already been used in this transactions protocol. We 
first give a new definition, by which the server’s attack is 
formalized; and then the security analysis will be processed 
with respect to this definition.  
 
   Definition  A server is successful in attacking this 
transaction protocol, if by utilizing some valid earlier 
transactions, the server can forge a new signature { }ρθ ,  for a 
new requirement 
*
Re Cq of the customer, where     θ  = 
( ) )(modRe, *1 pqCH C=θ  
and       xg
θ
ρ 1=  (in 1G ) (where x is the private of key of the 
customer) such that: 
 
  
( ) ( )( )
















   ( ) ( )ρα θα −= 21
xH
signed gf  .                          
           
  
In the following, we prove that the proposed transaction 
protocol is secure against a server’s attack. 
 
Theorem 1 The proposed transaction protocol is secure 
against the attacks made by a hostile server. 
 
Proof By the definition above, the hostile server needs to 
produce a new valid signature (a, b) for a special transaction 
( )γα ,, m , given a history of valid transactions. In fact, it is 
easy to produce a valid transaction ( )γα ,, m  for a given (a, 
b) by the procedures of Executing the Mobile Agent. However, 
It is hard to produce a new signature ( )ba,  of the customer 
such that a  includes a new requirement 
*
Re Cq , and also the 
transaction is accepted by the customer. However, the server 
will encounter the problem of solving q-SDH. And the q-SDH 
problem is difficult [2, 25]. 
              
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
 
In one-time successful e-transaction initiated by the 
customer, there are two rounds of communications between the 
customer and the underlying server. The computation 
workload is decided by the pair of functions ( )f  and 
( )
signedf . However, the function ( )f  has only one 
modular minus calculation.  The function ( )signedf   and the 
public key encryption algorithm (if needed) are two important 
factors, which will influence the performance of the e-
transaction protocol.  In fact, the function ( )signedf  implies 
two exponentiation modular computations, and one of them is 
modular inversion exponentiation computation. Fortunately, 
the latter can be precomputed by the customer. At the same 
time, the computation workload of the public key encryption 
algorithm is directly linked to what public key encryption 
algorithm will be utilized. In addition, there involved two Weil 
pairings computation in the procedure of the Checking the 




     In this paper, we presented a new transaction protocol using 
mobile agents. This protocol could be looked on as an instant 
of models of a virtual community. In a virtual community 
environment, security and privacy are two important issues. 
Therefore, this paper provides two aspects of analysis, i.e. 
security and privacy. Apart from these, we have also provided 
the overview for the construction of the protocol. In addition, 
as an important associated product, a new undetachable 
signature scheme is implied in the proposed transaction 
protocol. This signature scheme is of short signatures, which 
are only about 128bits or 160 bits for a practical security level. 
That will be very efficient for the mobile agents, since they 
need low computational workloads. 
     We will implement our transaction protocol and provide 
a test-bed for the virtual community. In the next stage of our 
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